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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
VIVIAN MEIER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 9855

MERRILL SOREN
CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injury arising
out of an intersection collision between the plaintiff and the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUIR'T
The defendant seeks to have the judgment of
the trial court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The principal facts out of which this action
arose have been recited in the Brief of the Appellant.
Further reference to the record will be made in
connection with respondent's argument.
1
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STATEMEN'T OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ALLEGE'D PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS OF THE COURT CONCERNING CERTAIN OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE,
AND COUNSEL'S INVITATION TO THE COUR'T TO
EXAMINE ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES, PRECLUDES ASSIGNING SUOH CONDUCT AS ERROR
ON APPEAL, WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, DID NOT
CONSTITUTE REVERSI'BLE ERROR.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED CONTRIBUTORY NEGUGE:NCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ALLEGEU PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS OF THE COURT CONCERNING CERTAIN OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE,
AND COUNSEL'S INVITATION TO THE COURT TO
EXAMINE ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES, PRECLUDES ASSIGNING SUCH CONDUCT AS ERROR
ON APPEAL, WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, DID NOT
CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.

'The plaintiff cites extensively from the record,
certain testimony of Leslie Jensen, the former Chief
of Police of Richfield. Claim is now made that
questions asked of the witness by the judge, and
comments made during the course thereof, constituted prejudicial error. During the course of the
testimony, the officer attempted to illustrate his
theory in arriving at the point of impact of the two
2
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automobiles. Portions of this testimony was objected
to by counsel for defendant. (R. 137). Thereafter
discussion ensued between Court and counsel 1as to
the basis of the testimony. Counsel for the plaintiff
then invited the court 'to interrogate the witness in
this language :
"MR. OLSEN: I would be glad to have
you ask that question of the officer if you
would like to . . . I think it might be well for
the jury to understand that." (R. 1'38).
Following this overture the court undertook to question the witness as cited on pages 6 through 12 of
Appellant's Brief. After the witness had made further explanation concerning his procedure in identifying the point of impact, Mr. Olsen then asked:
"Now did 'that answer your Honor's question as to the 'checks the officers had?" (R.
1'39).

A further discussion followed between the Oourt,
the witness and counsel, following which counsel
for the plain tiff again queried:
"MR. OLSEN: Do you have any further
questions, Your Honor?" (R. 140).
The appellant cl'aims the trial court's conduct
was prejudicial because attention was focused on
the importance of the problem. However, no objection was made ; rather, several relevant questions
were invited by plaintiff's counsel who expressed
his desire to have the jury hear the testimony so
developed. ( R. 138, 140).
The plaintiff points to a colloquy between Court
3
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and counsel which he claims was designed to "undermine" the testimony of the officer. Appellant's Brief
p. 9). These remarks followed a discussion between
counsel concerning the admission into evidence of
a proposed exhibit by the plaintiff. Certain comments of plaintiff's counsel were objected to as being argumentive. In ruling upon the offer the Court
stated:
"THE COUR'T: Let me say that I think
that it is probably confusing. Mter all the
only way to determine, it seems to me, the
point of impact, is take that area, for example
which is legally described as the intersection,
from the sidewalk on the north bordered by
the sidewalk on tile west, by the sidewalk on
the south, by the sidewalk on the east. Now
that area comprises your intersection.
"MR. OLSEN: 'That's correct, Your Honor." (R. 152).
'The plaintiff cannot properly assign as error a
statement by the Court with which agreement was
expressed. Additionally, the court's remark, was
m·ade during ·tfue course of ruling on a matter before
him. In any event, no objection to any question, remark or comment of the court, was ever registered
'by plain tiff.
It is not improper for the trial judge to express
to the jury his reasons for admitting or excluding
particular evidence, if while so doing he does not
indicate an erroneous view of the law which may
mislead the jury. 88 C.J.S. Trials, Sec. 50.
4
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In Fox vs. Taylor, 10 U.2d 174, 3'50 P.2d 154,
this Court stated.
"We recognize the duty of the court under
our law to avoid comments on the evidence; or
which may tend to indicate an opinion as to
what the facts are on disputed issues. Yet
it must be realized that it is quite impossible
to frame instructions applicable 'to a given
case without making some reference to facts
and sometimes to evidence."
It was there observed that a statement by the
Court that a "mere glance in the direction of the
approaching automdbile" is not sufficient to constitute due care. Further, the court pointed out 'that
elsewhere in 'the instructions the jury was told of
its sole prerogative to determine the facts on the
basis of the evidence.
In Douglas vs. Duvall, 5 U."2d 42'9, 4'31, 304
P;2d 3'73, conduct of the trial court was claimed
as prejudicial error when a discourse was given
outlining 'the duties of directors which was phrased
"somewhat in the vernacular." The charge was found
to be without merit. See also Federated Milk Producers Assn. vs. Statewide Plumbing, 11 U.2d 2'95,
358 P.2d 348. If any evidence is stated by the trial
judge, the jury must be advised tha:t they are the
exclusive judges of iall questions of fact. Such was
done in the present case. (See Instructions No. 2,
3, 4 and 6, R. 12, 13, 14 and 16).
In the case of State vs. Zimmerman, 78 U. 126,
1 P.2d 962, on motion for a new trial, the defendant
5
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assigned as error a statement by the trial court to
the jury after it appeared that the jury was having
difficulty in reaching a verdict, to the effect that
the evidence was clear and simple. The jury retired
and then returned shortly with a guilty verdict. The
following language is taken from the opinion:
"No claim is made by .appellant that any
objection or exception was taken to the statement m'ade by the trial court to the jury at
the time such statement was made or at all
until the filing of the motion for a new trial.
Appellant contends that the statement complained of was in the nature of an instruction
to the jury and should have been in writing.
It is well established in this jurisdiction that
an exception to an instruction must be made
before verdict, otherwise it may not be reviewed on appeal. The statement complained
of, however, cannot well be said to be an instruction, but whether it be regarded as an
instruction or as a remark, the rule is the
same. An objectionable remark directed to the
jury must be excepted to or it may not be reviewed on appeal. 17 C.J. 79. A remark of a
judge to a jury may not be said to be an order,
decision, or ruling and therefore it is not
deemed excepted to under the provisions of
section 6806, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917.
We are th ns precluded from reviewing the instruction or remark which appellant seeks to
have revietced, becattSe, so jar as appears, no
exception 1cas taken thereto until after verdict." (Emphasis added).
See also Tulsa Hospital Assn. vs. Juby, 73 Okla.
243, 175 P. 519.
6
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The basis of this rule is sound. For as stated
in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company
vs. Alan Oil Company, 123 U. 253, 258 P.2d 445,
450, one of the purposes in requiring counsel to make
objections to instructions in the trial court is to
bring to the attention of the court all claimed errors
in the instructions, and to give him an opportunity
to correct them if he deems proper. Just as a motion
to strike evidence, which turns out to be unfavorable to the party against whom it is offered, is not
a substitute for an objection, neither should a party
be permitted to object to invited questions of the
court when answers to them may not be as favorable as counsel had hoped. He has thus taken his
chances of advantage and should not have, when he
finds the testimony prejudicial, or at least not helpful, the legal right to exclude it or avoid the consequence by later objecting.Peterson v. Hansen-Niederhauser, 13 U.2d 3'55, 374 P.2d 5'13.
It is submitted that the questions put to plaintiff's witness by the court were invited by counsel,
that any reference to evidence by the court was
made within the proper discretion and province of
the court. Further, no objection was made to any
of such questions or comments and the plaintiff
cannot properly be heard to complain of these matters on appeal.
7
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE.

Appellan1t's contention that she entered the intersection in which the collision occurred first, assumes a factual conclusion which was a disputed
issue properly submitted to the jury, and determined
against her. There was evidence, based upon the point
df 'impact as fixed by the plaintiff's own witness,
from which the jury could properly conclude that
she was not first in the intersection and did not have
the right of way, since the defendant had traveled
nearly through the intersection before the collision
occurred in plaintiff's east lane of north-bound traffic. (Ptaintiff was proceeding north 'and Defendant
was proceeding east. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, R. 102).
Further there was testimony that plaintiff's windows
were covered with frost. (R. 176, 349). This, without more, is a sufficient basis for finding that the
plain tiff failed to keep a proper lookout or to exercise
due 'Care upon entering the intersection !and that she
was contributorily negligent in failing to yield the
right of way. The Court's Instruction Number 7
properly left to the jury the question of which driver
had the favored position in the intersection, and
accurately stated the law in respect thereto.
INSTRUC'Tl'ON NO. 7
"When two vehicles are approaching an
interesction at the same time and at substan8
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tially the same distance therefrom, the driver
approaching o nthe right has the right-of-way,
and it is the duty of the driver approaching
on the left to yield the right-of-way to the
former. This is the basic rule of right-of-way
at intersections and failure to abide by it constitutes negligence.
'~There is a secondary rule of right-ofway at intersections, which is that the driver
first entering the intersection has the rightof-way and it is the duty of the driver later
entering the intersection to yield to the former. However, this latter rule must not be so
applied that the drivers are permitted to speed
up or continue headlong into the intersection
merely because they enter a foot, or a yard,
or an instant of time ahead of the other. In
order for a driver approaching from the left
to ·take advantage of this rule he must not
have speeded up for the express purpose of
getting into the intersection first, and it must
appear that he had a clear and substantial
priority in time in entering the intersection
ahead of the driver approaching from the
right before the driver approaching from the
left m·ay claim the right-of-way." (R. 17).
'This instruction clearly and properly states the
law with respect to right of way at intersections
as provided in Section 41-6-72, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The court also gave the following related instructions:
INSTRUC'TION No. 9A
'·'You are instructed that the evidence
of reasonable care requires a driver to see
and observe what is there to be seen and fail9
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ure to see approaching vehicles within the
range of reasonable observation is negligence."

·J

INSTRUCTTON NO. 10
"When the law says that one person has
the right-of-way over another, it simply means
that one person has the immediate privilege
of occupying the space in question and the
other persons must yield to such person."
INSTUC'TION NO. 11
"'The fact that one has the right-of-way,
if such be the fact, does not excuse him from
the exercise of ordinary care to avoid causing
an accident.
The instructions taken together clearly define
the rule of la·w which should have been applied in
this case. The ptain tiff complains that the failure of
the court to give h'is Instruction No. 4. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 15, R. 47), was error because the jury
was not advised that if she were at the time of, and
immediately prior to the accident, driving her automobile into and across the intersection in a lawful
and proper manner, that "she had the right to assume and rely an'd 'act on the assumption that others
would do likewise; since she was not dbliged to anticipate either ·that other drivers would drive negligently nor fail to accord her right-of-way until in
the exercise of due care she observed, or should have
observed, something to warn her that the other driver
was driving negligently or would fail to accord her
the right-of-way."
10
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''

The court properly refused to give this instruction be~ause the circumstances of this case precluded
the applicabili!ty of the instruction to the facts as
established largely through her own testimony. ( R.
202) . She did not know her speed before entering
the intersection. She said that she looked to her
left as she approached the intersection. (R. 20'2).
She did not see the defendant's truck although it
was approaching from the left traveling 15-~20 mph~
(R. 348). Plaintiff suggests that her view of the
intersection was obstructed by a house, a parked
truck, and a high fence covered with vines and trees.
(R. '20'5). This would indicate that if rshe did look to
her lefrt, it was some distance from the intersection.
Near the intersection her view of First South Street,
on which defendant was traveling, was unobstructed. At her deposition she testified she didn't know
for sure if she had looked in both directions before
entering the intersection. ( R. 241). She first saw
the defendant's truck almost simultaneously with
the happening of the collision. (R. 24!5, 20'2, 203).
The only time that she looked to the left, if at all,
her vision w:as obscured, either from physical obstructions or from a frosted or steamed windshield.
She did not make an a;ttempt to observe approaching traffi,c to her left immediately before entering
the intersection. Thus, the court''s Instruction No.
9A was proper.
Even a ''glance" in the direction of approraching traffic does not satisfy the requirement of due
'11
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care. Fox vs. Taylor, 10 U.2d 174, 350 P.2d 154.
She is charged to see what reasonably could be observed.
Instruction No. 7, as given, is based upon Martin vs. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747, and
was properly adapted to the facts of this case, as
indica;ted by the more recent cases.
In Johnson vs. Syme, 6 U.2d 319, 313 P.2d 468,
the favored driver was held negligent as a matter
of law in failing to see a disfavored driver crossing
at an intersection until 20 to 30 feet away. The
Court concluded:
" . . . that plaintiff either looked and
failed to see the obvious, or failed to look at
all, and, as a mater of law negligently contributed to her own injuries. . . ."
'The following language is taken from Morris
vs. Christensen, 11 U.2d 140, 356 P.2d 34, concerning the duties of drivers at intersections:
"It is the duty of a driver to observe and
see what there is to see so :as to be able to exercise ordinary precaution and prevent collisions such as this. This duty extends to the
favored driver with the right of way as well
as the disfavored driver. But he who has the
right of way need not anticipate sudden outburs~ts of negligence on the part of another
driver. Indeed it may be said that failure to
observe is negligence proximately contributing to the harm only where by observing the
driver could have avoided or lessened the resulting harm."
'The circumstances presented in the present case
1

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

_-

..:..

indicate no "sudden outbursts of negligence", if any,
on the part of Christensen. He proceeded into the
intersection at aproximately 15-20 mph. Neither
dbserved the other until just before impact. Had
plaintiff seen defendant :at a time when reasonable
observation would have revealed his presence, the
collision could have been, by reasonable action, avoided or the harm lessened.
In Hess vs. Robinson, 109 U. 60, 163 P.2d 510,
the plaintiff was driving southward along a through
street and railed to see defendant's ambulance coming into the intersection from the west. A collision
occurred in the intersection. It was held that even
though pl1aintfff was negligent in not seeing the
ambulance, the question :as to whether his negligence
proximately contributed to his injury was properly
submitted to the jury. Similar facts exist in this
case. Plaintiff's contributory negligence in not looking to her left, or observing what she should have
observed, was properly submitted to the jury. The
facts were resolved against her and in reviewing
the matter on appeal the facts are to be viewed in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below. Ortega vs. Thomas, ____ U.2d ____ , 383 P.2d 406.
In Lowder vs. Holley, 120 U. 2'31, '2'3'3 P.2d 350,
cited by appeHant, the court found that the plaintiff's failure to see the defendant's approaching
truck could in no way have contributed to the accident because there was evidence which indicated
that even had he looked the defendant's truck would
1_3
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have been 2'50 feet 1away, and he could have assumed
and acted on the assumption that the driver of. tne
truck would exercise ordinary and reasonable care
in his driving and tha;t it would be safe to cross the
intersection. There is no such evidence in this case.
Observation would have revealed Defendant's truck
either within the intersection, or approaching so
closely as to make it unsafe to enter.
In the present case the plaintiff was negligent
in at least one of the f'ollowing particulars:
( 1) In failing to look before entering
the intersection, or
( 2) In f!a:iling to observe wha;t reasonaJble observation would have revealed; or
(3) In entering the intersection when
it was not safe to do so.

Thus, the plaintiff's requested instruction No.
4 to the effect that she was entitled to proceed into
the intersection until in the exercise of due care,
she observed, or should have observed, something
to warn her that the other driver was driving negligently or would ~ail to accord her right-of-way, had
no basis under the facts and testimony of this case.
The plaintiff also complains that a specific
instruction concerning proximate cause was not
given for the pllaintiff's benefit. Proximate cause
was correctly defined in Instruction No. 12. The
effect of negligence on the part of either party was
stated in Instruction No. 15A. It also dealt with
14
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and properly defined proximate cause. 'The plaintiff
assigns as error the failure of the Court to give his
Instruction No. 5 which deals with proximlate cause
and contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Both
were adequately dealt with in Instruction 15A.
Although appellant complains of the Court's Instruction No. 18, no obje'ction was made concerning
it. (R. 355-357).
The instructions are to be considered as a whole
since the Court dbviously cannot give all of the law
pertaining to the case in one instruction. When this
is done, it is apparent that the law of the case was
adequately covered in the instructions given and
no prejudicial error was committed.
CONCLUSTON
'The trial court did not commit prejudici1al error
in questioning the police officer who was 'Called as
plaintiff's witness. Such questioning was invited
by plaintiff's counsel and statements of evidence
made by the ~court were either agreed to, or were
made within permissible limits. No objections were
made to any of such proceedings \and cannot be properly raised for the first time on appeal. The court,
under the facts of this ~ase, properly instructed the
jury on the issues of contributory negligence and
proximate cause.
15
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It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
rendered on the jury verdi~t should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN and
MERLIN R. L YBBERT
By-------------------------------------------------------Attorneys for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIN·G
I certify that three ('3) copies of the foregoing
Brief were served upon Olsen & Chamberlain, attorneys for Appellant, 76 South Main Street, Richfield, Utah, by mailing the same, postage prepaid,
to said attorneys at the address stated this -----------day of September, 1963.
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